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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN  
SPECIAL OPERATIONS JOINT TASK FORCE-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

S: 12 August 2018

13 July 2018

NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A-CG

MEMORANDUM FOR [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) Special Operations Joint Task Force-A  
Afghanistan (SOJTF-A)

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Appointment as Investigating Officer

1 (U//~~FOUO~~) **Appointment.** I appoint you as an Investigating Officer (IO) pursuant to Army Regulation (AR) 15-6, Procedures for Administrative Investigations and Boards of Officers, to conduct an informal investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of Sergeant First Class (SFC) Christopher A. Celiz on 12 July 2018 in the vicinity of Zurmat, Paktiya Province, Afghanistan. Your responsibilities as an IO take precedence over all other military duties. You have 30 days from the date of this appointment to conduct this investigation. Coordinate any requests for extensions through your legal advisor.

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) **General Instructions.**

a. The purpose of an AR 15-6 investigation is to elicit facts. Conduct an investigation into the matters set forth in paragraph 3, below. Explore any issues or deficiencies with policies, procedures, resources, doctrine, training, and leadership that might have contributed to this incident. Upon completion of this investigation, complete a report of investigation that conforms to the requirements of paragraph 5 of this memorandum and AR 15-6. Provide your report to your legal advisor, who will arrange for a legal review.

b. If at any time in the conduct of your investigation, something happens that could cause me to consider enlarging, restricting, or terminating your investigation, or otherwise modifying any instruction in this memorandum of appointment, immediately report this situation to me, together with your recommendations as to the actions I should take in response.

3 (U//~~FOUO~~) **Scope of Investigation/Specific Instructions**

a. Conduct an investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of SFC Christopher A. Celiz that occurred on 12 July 2018 in the vicinity of Zurmat, Paktiya Province, Afghanistan

b. During your investigation you will, at a minimum, ascertain the following:

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(1) What was the nature of the mission? How was it developed, approved, and executed?

(2) How did the unit prepare for the mission, and what was their previous experience with missions of this kind? Describe any rehearsals, briefbacks, and other preparations, and any relevant previous operations conducted by this force

(3) What rules of engagement, tactical guidance, tactical directives, or other operational orders governed the mission? Did the individuals involved in this incident comply with them?

(4) Describe in detail the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident, develop a timeline and detailed description of the terrain, buildings, vehicles, and general area where the incident occurred; if you believe it would be value added, create and reference a diagram or other visual aid to assist you with this description.

(5) What were the causes and extent of SFC Celiz's injuries?

(6) What medical treatment, if any, was provided to SFC Celiz? Include specific details related to the medical assistance provided at the scene, details of the MEDEVAC process, including the timing of the request(s), when MEDEVAC assets arrived, and where the individuals were taken after the incident.

(7) What personal protective equipment did SFC Celiz wear at the time of his injuries?

(8) Was SFC Celiz's death incurred in the line of duty pursuant to AR 600-8-4?

(9) What force protection techniques did U.S. forces and/or partner forces use during this particular operation and what air assets were assisting the unit at the time of contact?

(10) Was any of the SFC Celiz's hand-receipted military equipment destroyed or lost during the operation?

(11) Any other matters pertaining to this incident that you deem relevant.

4. (U//FOUO) Conduct of the Investigation.

a. (b)(3), (b)(6) SOJTF-A Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, is your legal advisor. Consult with him before making substantive efforts regarding your investigation

b. Evidence Collection.

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(1) Conduct this investigation using the procedures outlined in Chapter 4, and the general guidance provided in Chapter 3, AR 15-6.

(2) To the extent possible, witness statements will be written and sworn. You should record witness statements on a DA Form 2823 (*Sworn Statement*). If it is impracticable to obtain a written and/or sworn statement from a particular witness, you will attest to the accuracy of any transcription or summary of such witness testimony in whatever form it appears within your report of investigation. No U.S. military or civilian witness can be ordered to provide information that may incriminate himself. **If, in the course of your investigation you come to suspect a person may have engaged in criminal conduct, you will consult with your legal advisor and inform me.** Under no circumstances should you attempt to elicit any information from a suspect without first advising that person of his/her rights under Article 31(b), UCMJ, or the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as appropriate. Document your rights advisement and witness waivers of their Article 31(b) or Fifth Amendment rights on a DA Form 3881 (*Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate*).

5. (U//~~FOUO~~) Report of Investigation.

a. General. Your report of investigation will be written. Use a DA Form 1574-1, *Report of Proceedings by Investigating Officer*, and attach all required enclosures and exhibits.

b. Assembly. Your completed AR 15-6 investigation will include a binder with the following items:

- (1) A one-to-two page executive summary.
- (2) An index of enclosures and exhibits (as Enclosure I);
- (3) This memorandum of appointment (as Enclosure II);
- (4) A completed and signed DA Form 1574-1 (as Enclosure III);
- (5) A findings and recommendations memorandum (as Enclosure IV);
- (6) A list of the witnesses you interviewed (as Enclosure V);
- (7) A chronology of your investigation (as Enclosure VI);
- (8) Proper classification markings for each paragraph, page, and exhibit included with your report of investigation; and
- (9) All exhibits properly labeled.

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c. Findings. You will reach your findings by a preponderance of the evidence you gather. A finding is a clear and concise statement of facts that can be readily deduced from evidence in the record. In your report, develop specific findings and cite the evidence that supports your findings. If there is conflicting evidence, make a finding as to which evidence is more credible and why you believe it is more credible. Each paragraph must be appropriately classified, and the memorandum must be appropriately labeled with its overall classification. **Maximize the use of unclassified materials and limit the use of classified materials as much as possible.** Consult original classifying authorities to declassify materials whenever possible.

d. Recommendations. Based on your findings, make recommendations regarding what changes, if any, are needed in terms of policies, procedures, resources, doctrine, training, and leadership to avoid incidents of this nature in the future, as well as recommendations consistent with your findings concerning other items your investigation revealed. Each recommendation will cite to the finding that supports it, and should comport with the guidance of AR 15-6.

e. Submission. Submit your report of investigation in one hard copy and an electronic copy on a compact disk after you have obtained a legal review. You may not release any information related to this investigation to anyone, other than your legal advisor, without my approval.

6. (U//~~FOUO~~) This appointment memorandum authorizes you priority 1 travel status throughout the AOR for the duration of your investigation

7. (U//~~FOUO~~) I authorize the Staff Judge Advocate, SOJTF-A, to approve extensions up to 15 calendar days from the original suspense for this investigation. I withhold approval of any extension requests beyond that period. Submit requests for extension in writing through your legal advisor.

8. (U//~~FOUO~~) The point of contact is the SOJTF-A SJA at SVOIP (b)(6)

(b)(6)

ALBERT M. ELTON II  
Major General, USAF  
Commanding General

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**REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER**

Note. Completed forms may contain personally identifiable information and require handling as set forth in AR 340-21.  
For use of this form, see AR 15-6, the proponent agency is OTJAG.

IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED IN FILLING OUT ANY PORTION OF THIS FORM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS

**SECTION I - APPOINTMENT**

Appointed by Maj Gen Albert M. Elton II

(Appointing authority)

on 20180713 (Date) (Attach enclosure 1: Letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment data.) (See para 3-15, AR 15-6.)

**SECTION II - TIMELINE**

1. The (investigation) commenced at Camp Vance, Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan at 1430  
(Place) (Time)  
on 20180713  
(Date)

2. The (investigating officer) finished gathering/hearing evidence a 2100 on 20180811 and completed  
(Time) (Date)  
findings and recommendations at 1900 on 20180811  
(Time) (Date)

**SECTION III - CHECKLIST FOR PROCEEDINGS**

A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES		YES	NO <sup>1/</sup>	NA <sup>2/</sup>
1.	Enclosures (para 3-13, AR 15-6) Are the following enclosed and numbered consecutively with Roman numerals: (Attached in order listed)			
	a. The memorandum of appointment?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	b. All other written communications to or from the appointing authority?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	c. Privacy Act Statements (Certificate, if statement provided orally)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	d. Explanation by the investigating officer of any unusual delays, difficulties, irregularities, or other problems encountered (e.g., absence of material witnesses)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	e. Any other significant papers (other than evidence) relating to administrative aspects of the investigation?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	f. An Executive Summary, Index of Exhibits, Chronology of the Investigation and lists of all persons interviewed and evidence gathered. (Complex, serious and/or high profile cases)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2.	Exhibits (para 3-14, AR 15-6)			
	a. Are all items offered (whether or not received) or considered as evidence individually numbered or lettered as exhibits and attached to this report?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	b. Is an index of all exhibits offered to or considered by investigating officer attached before the first exhibit?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	c. Has the testimony/statement of each witness been recorded verbatim or been reduced to written form and attached as an exhibit?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	d. Are copies, descriptions, or depictions (if substituted for real or documentary evidence) properly authenticated and is the location of the original evidence indicated?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	e. Are descriptions or diagrams included of locations visited by the investigating officer (Appendix C-3, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	f. Is each written stipulation attached as an exhibit and is each oral stipulation either reduced to writing and made an exhibit or recorded?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

FOOTNOTES: <sup>1/</sup> Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet

<sup>2/</sup> Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation

SECTION IV - FINDINGS (para 3-10, AR 15-6)

The (investigating officer), having carefully considered the evidence, finds: *(Each paragraph should be one conclusion based on the evidence gathered during the investigation. These findings should provide answers to each question posed by the appointing authority in the appointment memorandum. The evidence that supports each finding must be cited.)*

See Findings and Recommendations Memorandum.

**SECTION V - RECOMMENDATIONS** (para 3-11, AR 15-6)

In view of the above findings, the (investigating officer) recommends: [Each paragraph should be one recommendation based on the findings in Section IV. Address what actions, if any, should be taken with regard to the individuals involved, the unit leadership, and any steps that can be taken to prevent the occurrence in the future. Recommendations do not need to be adverse or punitive. For example, the investigation results can be used as a training tool.]

See Findings and Recommendations Memorandum.



SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATION (para 3-15, AR 15-6)

THE CONTENT OF PROCEEDINGS IS COMPLETE AND ACCURATE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

SECTION VII - ACTION BY APPROVING AUTHORITY (para 2-8, AR 15-6)

The findings and recommendations of the (investigating officer) are

It is received with the following modifications

1. The following findings of fact are added/deleted:

2. The following findings of fact are modified as follows:

3. The following recommendations are added/deleted:

4. The following recommendations are modified as follows:

(5) The action recommended in recommendation \_\_\_\_\_ has been accomplished by \_\_\_\_\_

Recommendation(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is not appropriate for action by this command; however, a copy of this investigation is being furnished to \_\_\_\_\_ for such action, as deemed appropriate

Disapproved

The report is (incomplete), (ambiguous), (erroneous) and/or (specify deficiency) with respect to \_\_\_\_\_

It is therefore hereby returned to the IO for corrective action as follows \_\_\_\_\_

AUG 24 2018

(b)(6)

ALBERT M. ELTON II  
Major General, USAF  
Commanding General

~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
SPECIAL OPERATIONS JOINT TASK FORCE - AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A-J35

19 August 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR Commanding General, Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (SOJTF-A), Afghanistan, APO, AE 09354

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation – Death of SFC Christopher Celiz in Zurmat, Paktiya Province, Afghanistan on 12 July 2018

1. (U) References.

a. (U) Memorandum of Appointment, dated 13 July 2018 (U)

b. (U) Army Regulation (AR) 15-6, Procedures for Administrative Investigations and Boards of Officers (U)

2. ~~(S//REL USA FVEY)~~ **Background.** On 13 July 2018, I was appointed by the SOJTF-A Commanding General as an investigating officer pursuant to AR 15-6. The purpose of the investigation was to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of Sergeant First Class (SFC) Christopher A. Celiz during combat operations on 12 July 2018 in the vicinity of Zurmat, Paktiya Province, Afghanistan.

3. ~~(S//REL to USA, FVEY)~~ **Summary.** On 12 July 2018 during (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a Friendly Forces (b)(1)1.4a and Partner Forces) arrived at the vehicle drop-off location to clear a nearby compound. While conducting dismounted clearance of building D1080, a member of the Afghan partner force was wounded by small arms fire. During the MEDEVAC of the partner force, SFC Celiz was also wounded by small arms fire. Both casualties were evacuated to (b)(1)1.4a care at FOB Dahlke. SFC Celiz expired while in surgery at FOB Dahlke Role II.

4. ~~(S//REL to USA, FVEY)~~ **Overview.** I was officially notified of my appointment on 13 July 2018. I began to gather and compile background data from 14 July and received my legal briefing on the same day. Due to my current location next to Camp Alpha, I was able to make contact with TF J3 in order to make contact with SFC Celiz's team members from the operation. I acquired the Zurmat CONOP through the appropriate SOJTF-A channels to have a better understanding of the overall mission, enemy situation, and Coalition assets supporting the mission. Due to (b)(1)1.4a operational tempo, rest cycle, and concurrent (b)(1)1.4a tempo, I was unable to make it down to their forward location. All communication and gathering of information for the investigation was pushed through SIPR email and phone conversations. On 14 July I made contact with (b)(3), (b)(6) regarding my duties. (b)(3), (b)(6) directed me towards (b)(3), (b)(6) on 15 July. (b)(3), (b)(6) directed me to the (b)(1)1.4a Team

~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~

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(b)(3), (b)(6) From 15 to 17 July I was in constant contact with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) via phone and email. On 17 July I received my initial sworn statements from one of SFC Celiz's team members during the operation. The TF operators included: (b)(3), (b)(6) SFC Celiz, (b)(3), (b)(6). I submitted my draft findings and recommendations on 11 August. I received edits from my legal advisor on 12 August, and re-submitted my report on 14 August. From the 15-19 August I was asked to get statements from the other two members of SFC Celiz's team, as well as develop a graphic depicting the engagement.

#### 5. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Summary of Relevant & Material Facts.

a. (U) Personnel Directly Involved at the Time of the Incident. Below are SFC Celiz's team members that participated in the 12 July 18 Zurmat operation.

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) for (b)(1)1.4a TM2, and was the (b)(3), (b)(6) for TM2 on 12 July 2018. (b)(3), (b)(6) with (b)(3), (b)(6) assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment. He has been on five combat deployments to Afghanistan. The first three deployments, he held the position of (b)(3), (b)(6). Prior to this deployment he served as the (b)(3), (b)(6) for (b)(6)(1)1.4a. This deployment he has been on 25 missions spreading across Khowst, Paktiya, Paktika, and Jowzjan. For this operation, he and his team were on mission for no less than 30 hours on the southern objective area.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) for (b)(1)1.4a TM2, and was the (b)(3), (b)(6) for TM2 on 12 July 2018. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3) 10 USC 130b/(b)(6) in the Army. He has (b)(3), (b)(6) assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment. He has been on two combat deployments to Afghanistan. The first he held the position of (b)(3), (b)(6) for (b)(1)1.4a. This deployment he has been on 20 missions spreading across Khowst, Paktiya, Paktika, and Jowzjan. For this operation, he and his team were on mission for no less than 30 hours on the southern objective area.

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) for (b)(1)1.4a TM2, and was the (b)(3), (b)(6) for TM2 on 12 July 2018. (b)(3), (b)(6) with (b)(3), (b)(6) months in the army. He has (b)(3), (b)(6) assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment. He has been on one combat deployment to Afghanistan. This deployment he has been on 20 missions spreading across Khowst, Paktiya, Paktika, and Jowzjan. For this operation he and his team were on mission for no less than 30 hours on the southern objective area.

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b. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Concept of Operation. The mission called for (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a to conduct (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a between 11-13 July 2018 in order to (b)(1)1.4a Afghan and Coalition Forces. TF requested approval to conduct this operation on Sahak Village located in Zurmat District, Paktiya Province. According to the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) reporting, Sahak Village, and surrounding villages, had historical Taliban (TB) and Haqqani (HQN) militant activity associated with TB commander (b)(1)1.4a and TB/HQN facilitator (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a. The area had been used to support attacks against the Zurmat district center and militant operations into Gardez. (b)(1)1.4a operation would demonstrate friendly forces' ability to project and maintain security in the area (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a (See exhibit D).

c. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Narrative. After the element provided over watch on their second Named Area of Interest (NAI), SFC Celiz's team, along with the partnered force, came under a large volume of effective machine gun and sniper fire from various compounds to their north. A member of SFC Celiz's team was notified that a partnered force member had been wounded during the initial contact with the enemy. The team immediately returned fire towards the enemy's known and likely positions in the vicinity of the building designated "D990" as the team sought cover from enemy fire. SFC Celiz decided to split his four man team into two elements. One element provide suppressive fire to likely and known enemy targets, while SFC Celiz took his team medic (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) to the vehicle in order to prep the (b)(1)1.4a SFC Celiz exposed himself to enemy fire, targeted the enemy structure 600m away, and neutralized the position with the recoilless rifle. SFC Celiz's team then bounded back to friendly forces, and SFC Celiz kept his team in separate elements. This would enable his team to provide initial aide to their wounded partner and prep him for MEDEVAC, while also providing cover fire. During the evacuation of the wounded partner, the element came under a high volume of enemy fire. SFC Celiz aided the wounded partner, moved back to a position with cover and continued to provide suppressive fire on the enemy, protecting friendly elements and the MEDEVAC helicopter. He was fatally wounded by small arms fire while bounding back to the MEDEVAC helicopter. The MEDEVAC helicopter had taken off once the partner force casualty was loaded, but was called back to evacuate SFC Celiz. (b)(3), (b)(6) with assistance from two partner force Soldiers, re-exposed themselves to an enemy fire and carried SFC Celiz, loading him onto the MEDEVAC helicopter. The MEDEVAC then flew directly to the (b)(1)1.4a (See Exhibits A, B, C, & G).

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~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~

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d. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ There was no criminal intent, misconduct, or negligence on the part of any member of the patrol during the fire-fight with insurgents. On the contrary, SFC Celiz and his Rangers distinguished themselves under fire. SFC Celiz's team knew their mission, primary and secondary duties, as well as their contingency plan in case a team member was wounded due to enemy fire. SFC Celiz's team continued to shoot, move, and communicate while bounding back to covered positions in order to provide treatment to the wounded (b)(1)1.4a partner and to continue to suppress/neutralize enemy positions. (See Exhibits A, B, & C).

6. (U//~~FOUO~~) Findings. After carefully considering the evidence, I find the following:

a. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ *What was the nature of the mission? How was it developed, approved, and executed?* This is addressed in para. 5(b). In short, the mission was to

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

The mission was developed through extensive intelligence collection and analysis from multiple sources including

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

The mission was appropriately staffed and approved through SOJTF-A. This particular operation called for a GAF to the objective.

b. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ *How did the unit prepare for the mission, and what was their previous experience with missions of this kind? Describe any rehearsals, brief backs, and other preparations, and any relevant previous operations conducted by this force. Review of the unit members' individual experience is reviewed in para. 5(a). The unit prepared for the mission through*

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

from previous operations, real time intelligence

(b)(1)1.4a

The unit conducted collective static and movement rehearsals.

c. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ *What rules of engagement, tactical guidance, tactical directives, or other operational orders governed the mission? Did the individuals involved in this incident comply with them?* The following guidance and directives were in place at the time of the mission, and governed its execution: (1) the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE); (2) the Operation Freedom's Sentinel ROE; (3) the United States Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Tactical Directive; and (4) the SOJTF-A Tactical Directive. SFC Celiz's team complied with all of them. Every member followed the current ROE and Tactical Directive.

d. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ *Describe in detail the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident; develop a timeline and detailed description of the terrain, buildings,*

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vehicles, and general area where the incident occurred; if you believe it would be value added, create and reference a diagram or other visual aid to assist you with this description. On 12 July 2018, at roughly 0500 local, SFC Celiz's team began to take accurate and sustained machine gun and sniper fire. At the time, they were dismounted and clearing compounds of interest. The initial contact hit the driver's side window of their empty truck, not far from the team's location. The team for the next several minutes engaged the enemy from the vicinity of buildings D1080 and D1070, primarily from behind a dilapidated structure about five feet tall and eight feet long. During this engagement, the partner force took a casualty. SFC Celiz split his team, and took (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) with him to retrieve the (b)(3), (b)(6) which he used to level the structure from which his team was taking fire. Displaying this initiative and exposing himself to hostile fire to engage the enemy with the recoilless rifle, neutralized the enemy and provided approximately 30 minutes to recover the casualty and call in MEDEVAC helicopters. Roughly upon the arrival of the MEDEVAC helicopters, the enemy fire resumed. SFC Celiz again exposed himself to enemy fire in order to cover the MEDEVAC's arrival, loading of the casualty, and departure. As the MEDEVAC departed, having spent only a few minutes on the ground, SFC Celiz was wounded by enemy small arms fire and fell. He tried to get up, only to collapse again, remaining unconscious. SFC Celiz's team and the partner forces maintained their fire on the enemy, while exposing themselves to recover SFC Celiz, who had been shot in the right flank, above his body armor. They called back the MEDEVAC, which landed again, and they loaded SFC Celiz into it, roughly three minutes after he was wounded. SFC Celiz arrived at FOB Dahlke roughly ten minutes after he was injured, where the (b)(1)1.4a tirelessly operated on him for approximately one hour and 40 minutes. After this effort, the surgeon determined SFC Celiz had expired. Attachment A to this report depicts where the firefight resulting in SFC Celiz's death took place.

e. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ *What were the causes and extent of SFC Celiz's injuries?* SFC Celiz's injuries stemmed from effective/accurate enemy fire he received while bounding back, leaving his last covered position, as he provided a high volume of fire to protect his team, litter team, and MEDEVAC aircraft. SFC Celiz was shot as the MEDEVAC aircraft initially took off. He was hit on his right side (between the side plate and arm pit). The round entered his right side and traveled up towards his vital area near the heart. This single bullet caused the sum total of his injuries.

f. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ *What medical treatment, if any, was provided to SFC Celiz? Include specific details related to the medical assistance provided at the scene, details of the MEDEVAC process, including the timing of the request(s), when MEDEVAC assets arrived, and where the individuals were taken after the incident. No meaningful treatment or assessment was conducted on the ground (prior to MEDEVAC lift off) due*

NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A-J35

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation – Death of SFC Christopher Celiz in Zurmat, Paktiya Province, Afghanistan on 12 July 2018

to the tactical and enemy situation and the patient's condition, and the fact that MEDEVAC was already on the scene. The (b)(1)1.4a and three partner force Soldiers transferred his body to a litter and moved him onto the MEDEVAC helicopter. The element worked quickly and steadily as it took a total of 3 minutes from the time SFC Celiz was shot to boarding the helicopter. (See Exhibit B). SFC Celiz's team placed him on the litter with body armor and helmet removed. The MEDEVAC, which was in the process of leaving with the first wounded individual, was ordered and directed by the ground team to find a secondary landing zone in order to get SFC Celiz on board. SFC Celiz was immediately flown to Dahlke (b)(1)1.4a for treatment. SFC Celiz's initial care was being monitored by (b)(3), (b)(6) SFC Celiz arrived at the Dahlke (b)(1)1.4a facility at 0610 on 12 July 2018. The surgeon, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) treated SFC Celiz for a gunshot wound to the right flank. The trauma team worked continuously on SFC Celiz for approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes until the surgeon called SFC Celiz expired at 0802hrs. (See Exhibit G). The medical care included bilateral needle decompression catheters, chest compressions, an emergent thoracotomy, and placing a femoral arterial line and femoral venous catheter for high volume resuscitation with blood product. Upon entry into the chest, the surgeon discovered two large injuries to the right ventricle. While there were some brief moments of heart activity during the surgery, SFC Celiz never regained meaningful cardiac activity.

g. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) What personal protective equipment did SFC Celiz wear at the time of his injuries? SFC Celiz was equipped in accordance with the (b)(1)1.4a policy regarding individual protective equipment: M4A1 (MOD) Rifle, (b)(1)1.4a side arm; (b)(1)1.4a Ballistic Helmet (b)(1)1.4a (hearing protection / communication); Ballistic Eyewear; (b)(1)1.4a (Night Vision Device); (b)(1)1.4a Plate carrier with front, back, and side ESAPI plates; tactical gloves, 2 x CAT Tourniquets; standard (b)(1)1.4a knee / elbow pad inserts.

h. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) Was SFC Celiz's death incurred in the line of duty pursuant to AR 600-8-4? SFC Celiz was conducting (b)(1)1.4a offensive operations in support of Operating Freedom Sentinel. Considering the nature of his actions and the circumstances of his death, there can be no question that per AR 600-8-4, SFC Celiz's death was in the line of duty.

i. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) What force protection techniques did U.S. forces and/or partner forces use during this particular operation and what air assets were assisting the unit at the time of contact? The U.S. and partner forces were executing operations in accordance with the OFS ROE. The current ROE are briefed during the mission brief

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back from the Commander down to the lowest levels. The force had an Air Weapons Team (AWT) of 2 x AH-64s and an F-16 in support of their operations.

j. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Was any of the SFC Celiz's hand-receipted military equipment destroyed or lost during the operation? SFC Celiz's individual military equipment i.e. individual weapon system, NVGs, radios, body armor, accompanied him on the MEDEVAC helicopter. Reviewing the sworn statements from SFC Celiz's team, nothing was mentioned about his hand receipted military equipment being lost or destroyed during the 12 July 2018 operation. If any was lost or destroyed, it should be classified as a combat loss.

k. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Any other matters pertaining to this incident that you deem relevant. SFC Celiz's actions during the 12 July 2018 Operation went above and beyond the call of duty in order to protect his team and his partner forces from being injured or killed by enemy small arms/machine gun fire.

7. ~~(S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA)~~ Recommendations. In view of the above findings, I recommend the following:

a. TF continually refine tactical SOPs from operational AARs. They should sustain their basic small unit tactics at the individual and collective levels as these prove to be the most effective measures to prepare teams/squads to identify enemy threats. Team, squad, and joint rehearsals continue to play a critical role when reacting to enemy contact. Continue to sustain the six War Fighting Functions and sustain the development of team members knowing the next operator's job.

b. All TF elements continue to sustain effective communication with MEDEVAC aircraft and continue to plan for alternate HLZs during enemy contact on the objective.

c. A copy of this report be provided to TF to support the appropriate award to recognize SFC Celiz's valorous actions during the firefight.

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) There is no disciplinary action or further investigation into this incident required. There was no misconduct or negligence leading to SFC Celiz's death. SFC Celiz continued to provide a high volume of fire to ensure the safety of his team, the wounded partner, and the MEDEVAC helicopters. SFC Celiz lived the Ranger creed until his last moment, suppressing the enemy during a critical operation in order to defeat terrorism during the continued Global War of Terror.



NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A-J35

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation – Death of SFC Christopher Celiz in Zurmat, Paktiya Province, Afghanistan on 12 July 2018

8. (U//~~FOUO~~) The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at SVOIP:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Investigating Officer

1 Attachment:

1. Graphic of Engagement Area

**SEQUENCE OF EVENTS**

1 AT APPROXIMATELY 0509D, THE ASSAULT FORCE, IVO BLDG D1070 AND D1080 REPORTED RECEIVING EFFECTIVE ENEMY MACHINE GUN FIRE AND SNIPER FIRE IVO BLDG D1040 AND D1050, RESULTING IN 1X PARTNER WIA.

2 WITH THE PARTNERED FORCE UNABLE TO MANEUVER AT 0525D, THE TL AND MEDIC MANEUVERED FROM THEIR COVERED AND CONCEALED POSITION, EXPOSING THEMSELVES TO DIRECT FIRE TO RETRIEVE THE (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6) FROM THE VDC.

3 THE TL AND MEDIC THEN MANEUVERED INTO THE OPEN EXPOSING THEMSELVES TO DIRECT FIRE TO ENGAGE ENY FORCES APPROXIMATELY 900m TO THE EAST WITH 2X HE ROUNDS, REDUCING THE ENEMY DEFENSIVE STRUCTURE AT 0544, THE AF PASSED THE 9-LINE MEDEVAC FOR 1X WOUNDED PARTNER.

4 AT APPROXIMATELY 0552D, THE AF REPORTED DUSTOFF W/ID APPROXIMATELY 80m SOUTH OF FF EXTERNAL TO BLDG D1080, AS DUSTOFF LANDED IVO OF THE HLZ, THE AF REPORTED RECEIVING EFFECTIVE ENEMY MACHINE GUN FIRE FROM BLDG 899, THE AF IVO BLDG D1080 SUPPRESSED ENY FORCES APPROXIMATELY 900m E OF THE HLZ, ALLOWING THE TL AND MEDIC TO TRANSLAD THE TX WIA ONTO DUSTOFF.

5 AT APPROXIMATELY 0553D, AS THE TL AND MEDIC WERE PREPARING TO TRANSLAD THE TX WIA, THE TL REALIZED THAT DUSTOFF WAS TAKEN EFFECTIVE ENY MACHINE GUN FIRE FROM APPROXIMATELY 900m E OF THEIR LOCATION, THE TL POSITIONED HIMSELF IN THE OPEN BETWEEN THE DUSTOFF AIRCRAFT AND ENY FORCES TO SUPPRESS THE ENY MG POSITION, ALLOWING THE MEDIC TO TRANSLAD THE CASUALTY.

6 AT APPROXIMATELY 0556D, AS THE TL CONTINUED TO SUPPRESS THE ENY MG POSITION DUSTOFF REPORTED W/ID FROM THE HLZ, NEAR SIMULTANEOUSLY AS THE TL WAS PROVIDING SUPPRESSIVE FIRE TO ALLOW DUSTOFF TO EXFIL, THE TL RECEIVED A GSW TO THE RIGHT SIDE.


7 AT APPROXIMATELY 0557D, THE (b)(1)1.4a MEDIC MOVED FROM BLDG D1080 UNDER EFFECTIVE ENY MG FIRE TO RECOVER THE TL FROM THE OPEN, THE (b)(1)1.4a AND MEDIC THEN MOVED THE TL WEST OF BLDG D1080 AND COORDINATED FOR DUSTOFF TO IMMEDIATELY RETURN TO EVACUATE THE CRITICALLY WOUNDED TL AT 0559D DUSTOFF LANDED WEST OF BLDG D1080 WITH THE AF STILL IN CONTACT TO MEDEVAC THE TL.

11-13 JUL 2018 ZURMAT DISTRICT, PAKTIYA PROVINCE (42S WC 0609)

**MISSION: TASK FORCE conducts an advised GAF Force Protection Patrol FPP ZURMAT IN ZURMAT DISTRICT, PAKTIYA PROVINCE**

(b)(1)1.4a from 11-13 JUL18 101

(b)(1)1.4a



ATTACHMENT 1 TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## List of All Persons Interviewed

<u>Name</u>	<u>Date Interviewed</u>	<u>Type of Interview</u>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px; text-align: center;">(b)(3), (b)(6)</div>	14 July 2018	Phone
	15 July 2018	Phone
	16 July 2018	Phone
	17 July 2018	Phone
	17 July 2018	Phone
	18 July 2018	Email (Sworn statements)
	06 Aug 2018	Phone



UNCLASSIFIED  
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

HEADQUARTERS  
NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN  
SPECIAL OPERATIONS JOINT TASK FORCE - AFGHANISTAN  
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A-CG

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, Special Operations Joint Task Force- Afghanistan

SUBJECT: Chronology, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of (b)(1)1.4a  
Partnered Clearing Operation, Zurmort Province

1. Below is a chronology detailing the steps taken during this investigation:

13 July 2018, 1000D	Received notification of appointment
13 July 2018, 1430D	Received appointment memorandum
13 July 2018, 1103D	Received legal briefing
14 July 2018, 2029D	Spoke with (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6) on my IO duties
15 July 2018, 1400D	Spoke with (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6) on sworn statements / future (b)(3), (b)(6)
15 July 2018, 1038D	Received email from (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) regarding interview link up
16 July 2018, 1141D	Spoke with (b)(3), (b)(6) on my IO duties
16 July 2018, 2043D	Spoke with (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6) on gathering sworn statements from (b)(1)1.4a assault force members
17 July 2018, 1216D	Spoke with (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6) regarding general overview of SFC Celiz's actions on mission and medical care at Dalhke
17 July 2018, 1421D	Email received from (b)(3), (b)(6) regarding draft sworn statements on SFC Celiz's injury during the OP
05 August 2018, 1524D	Spoke with (b)(3), (b)(6) (Dalhke) (b)(1)1.4a Surgeon on SFC Celiz's medical treatment
07 August 2018, 1426D	Email (sworn statement) received from (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) on SFC Celiz's medical care after arriving to Dalhke (b)(1)1.4a
07 August 2018, 2202D	Email received from (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(5) (Mortuary Affairs)
08 August 2018, 1515D	Email received from (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) Craig Joint Theater Hospital office
11 August 2018, 2100D	Submitted F&R memo for legal review
13 August 2018, 0937D	Received edits from legal advisor
14 August 2018, 1847D	Made edits and resubmitted to legal advisor
15-19 August 2018	Multiple revisions, development of more evidence

NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A-CG

SUBJECT: Chronology, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of Partnered Clearing Operation, Zurmont Province

(b)(1)1.4a

19 August 2018	Legal review signed
xx August 2018, xxxx D	Submitted investigation to Appointing Authority

2. Point of contact is the undersigned at SVOIP: (b)(3), (b)(6) or investigating officer  
@ (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Investigating Officer

Page 22 redacted for the following reason:

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(b)(5)

UNCLASSIFIED

**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.  
**ROUTINE USES:** Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION (b)(1)1.4a AFGHANISTAN	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20180727	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(6) AC	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (b)(1)1.4a 75TH RANGER REGIMENT			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:  
 On 12 JULY 2018, (b)(1)1.4a and a partnered force conducted a Force Protection Patrol (FPP) in order to remove Taliban influence from Zurmat District, Paktiva Province, Afghanistan. At our final checkpoint before occupying our vehicle drop off (VDO) location, ISR assets notified (b)(3), (b)(6) that an armed enemy fighter had maneuvered on the ground assault force (GAF) in order to engage us as we set in our VDO from approximately 150 meters. Then, (b)(3), (b)(6) took initiative to neutralize the threat to our GAF by coordinating a strike with (b)(1)1.4a from AWT which resulted in one enemy killed in action (EKIA). After arriving to our vehicle drop off (VDO) location, the partnered force set (b)(1)1.4a in order to clear our first named area of interest (NAI). After the partnered force cleared our first NAI, the command and control (C2) element, which included (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) SFC Celiz, (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself, advanced to a dilapidated building about 5 foot tall and 8 foot wide at the northeastern edge of the first NAI to gain tactical advantage and covered over watch of our second NAI clearance. At approximately 0500 local, the C2 element and partnered forces received accurate PKM, AK-47, and sniper fire from compounds to the north at a sustained rate of fire. The assault force returned fire and sought cover. There were 10 to 15 round bursts every 15 seconds impacting the walls of the building D1080 and D1070 to our west and north along with the ground within 10 meters of our position. SFC Celiz made visual contact with enemy fighters in a building to our North approximately 600 meters away. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(6) were able to engage the enemy with 6 rounds each of suppressive fire from behind cover of our dilapidated structure. We could see a dust trail after the brief engagement by (b)(3), (b)(6) and the (b)(6) which indicated that the enemy had retreated in a vehicle from the compound they were in. The enemy began to engage us from the east within a minute or two after the first engagement. We received a heavy volume of accurate enemy PKM and sniper fire from compounds 500 to 900 meters away. The enemy maintained 10 to 15 round bursts every 10 seconds which I saw impacting the walls of the structure we took cover behind as well as hitting the ground within 10 meters of our position. Our assault force began to immediately return fire onto known, likely, and suspected enemy positions from covered positions. We exposed ourselves from the torsos and above to return effective suppressive fire. However, I did pull (b)(3), (b)(6) behind cover several times while he was focused looking through his weapon's optic because I saw rounds impacting the wall within five meters to our south. Then, SFC Celiz chose to engage the enemy with the (b)(3), (b)(6) which was located in the bed of our vehicle 20 meters away from our location in the dilapidated structure. SFC Celiz ordered (b)(3), (b)(6) and I to provide suppressive fire while he and (b)(3), (b)(6) bounded fully exposed to the bed of the truck (b)(3), (b)(6) and I exposed ourselves from the torso to our heads to enemy fire in order to draw attention away from SFC Celiz and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and I each expended roughly 45 rounds from our M-4's while SFC Celiz and (b)(3), (b)(6) engaged the enemy with two (b)(1)1.4a rounds from the (b)(1)1.4a at the front driver's side of our vehicle. SFC Celiz and (b)(3), (b)(6) were able to reduce an enemy compound during this engagement despite their exposed position to the same volume of fire. After the second round from the (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a was fired, the enemy rate of fire slowed to sporadic fire. I saw approximately 10 to 15 round bursts impact the buildings around us every minute. SFC Celiz and (b)(3), (b)(6) bounded to western most wall of building D1080 to treat a partner force casualty during this lull in fire.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"  
 THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(5) TAKEN AT (b)(1)1.4a AF DATED 20180727

## 9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6) and I provided watch and shoot suppressive fires from the cover of the dilapidated structure while SFC Celiz and (b)(3), (b)(6) moved to the casualty. After SFC Celiz and (b)(3), (b)(6) were behind cover, (b)(3), (b)(5) began coordinating with aerial assets in order to find and destroy enemy fighters and fighting positions. SFC Celiz returned to our position to gain situational awareness on current enemy contact to assess whether or not to bring in DUSTOFF. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I then moved back with SFC Celiz to the location of the casualty. Once (b)(3), (b)(5) SFC Celiz, and I were at the casualty's location on the outside of the western wall of D1080, I prepared a nine-line MEDEVAC request which SFC Celiz relayed to the IOC. (b)(3), (b)(5) began coordinating with aerial assets in order to provide of flight and routing instructions to DUSTOFF. (b)(3), (b)(6) instructed me to provide (b)(1)1.4a to mark DUSTOFF's touchdown point. At this time, we were no longer in enemy contact for approximately 20 minutes. (b)(1)1.4a positioned one gun truck with a mounted (b)(1)1.4a at the southwest corner of our building and another gun truck approximately 100 meters to the west of the first gun truck in order to provide 360 degrees of security for the HLZ. As DUSTOFF landed short of our marked HLZ by about 75 meters, the enemy opened up with AK-47, PKM, and sniper fire from compounds 500 to 900 meters to our east. The enemy had sustaining and accurate 6 to 9 round bursts every five seconds which impacted the ground within 20 meters of DUSTOFF and the HLZ. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I immediately moved southwest of the first gun truck standing fully exposed to provide suppressive fires. (b)(3), (b)(6) immediately ran out to conduct a medical handover despite the volume of accurate fire with the litter team in trail. Noticing that SFC Celiz and (b)(3), (b)(6) began moving to provide suppressive fires, I stepped out to provide suppressive fires as well. I was about 15 meters southwest of the first gun truck. SFC Celiz also ran all the way to the door of DUSTOFF to provide suppressive fire. (b)(3), (b)(6) followed behind SFC Celiz and stopped approximately 10 meters from the nose of the aircraft. (b)(3), (b)(6) provided around 20 to 30 rounds of suppressive fire in about a minute, standing fully exposed to the enemy PKM fire in order to provide as much fire superiority until the litter team. (b)(3), (b)(6) and SFC Celiz returned behind cover. (b)(3) 10 USC 130b(b)(3) (b)(3), (b)(6) move back from his medical hand off, at which point, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and I turned to move back to a covered position. We came to a halt short of cover because we saw SFC Celiz still returning fire while standing in front of DUSTOFF in order to protect the casualty, pilots, and crew. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I both called out to SFC Celiz to return behind cover for a few seconds. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I moved back to our exposed positions and provided another 20-30 rounds each of suppressive fire hoping that SFC Celiz would return to the covered position. As (b)(3), (b)(6) continued to call for SFC Celiz, SFC Celiz turned in an attempt to move back and was struck by enemy fire, fell to a knee, waved DUSTOFF away, collapsed to the ground and pulled himself one time with his arm before going unconscious. (b)(3), (b)(6) began calling for SFC Celiz to crawl to him but SFC Celiz was unresponsive. While (b)(3), (b)(6) called for SFC Celiz, two partner force soldiers ran out under fire to retrieve SFC Celiz. During this time (b)(3), (b)(6) and I were still providing suppressive fires while standing fully exposed to the heavy volume of enemy PKM fire which I could see impacting the ground 10 meters in front of us. (b)(3), (b)(6) began moving and shooting while making his way to SFC Celiz. Then, (b)(1)1.4a followed closely to (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) ran bravely to SFC Celiz and began dragging behind cover while a few 6-9 rounds bursts of enemy PKM fire impacted within a couple meters of them. (b)(3), (b)(6) expended all 30 rounds in his magazine and then ran out to help the group dragging SFC Celiz while I continued suppressing the enemy with 15 to 20 rounds for another 15 seconds until SFC Celiz was returned to cover. Once (b)(3), (b)(6) SFC Celiz, the (b)(1)1.4a and partner force soldiers were behind cover I stepped behind the first gun truck, instructed the gunner to pick up his rate of fire, and moved to where (b)(3), (b)(6) was beginning to treat SFC Celiz. (b)(3), (b)(5) began to help (b)(3), (b)(6) treat SFC Celiz while simultaneously calling for DUSTOFF to return to the marked HLZ. DUSTOFF landed in another exposed position in direct line of sight of rapid and accurate enemy PKM fire from compounds to our east. (b)(3), (b)(6) lifted SFC Celiz and began to walk him to the aircraft which was still under a rapid rate of fire. Partner force soldiers then brought a litter and (b)(3), (b)(6) loaded him onto the litter. At this time (b)(3), (b)(6) along with three partner force soldiers continued to move into the enemy fire towards the HLZ to load SFC Celiz. The litter team was able to safely load SFC Celiz onto DUSTOFF and return back to cover.

SFC Celiz died protecting DUSTOFF and its crew in order to ensure the partner force casualty was able to reach higher care and prevent DUSTOFF from being shot down which would have potentially cost more lives. His final display of bravery, courage, and selfless devotion to his troops is the most honorable thing I have witnessed.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES



STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT (b)(1)1.4a AF DATED 20180727

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

[Redacted Statement Content]

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 17TH day of AUGUST, 2018

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(1)1.4a

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

1ST BATTALION 75TH RANGER REGIMENT

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a 75TH RANGER REGIMENT

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT			
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.			
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT			
<b>AUTHORITY:</b>		Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).	
<b>PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:</b>		To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.	
<b>ROUTINE USES:</b>		Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.	
<b>DISCLOSURE:</b>		Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.	
1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
(b)(1)1.4a Afghanistan	20180717	2300	
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS	
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS			
(b)(1)1.4a 75th Ranger Regiment			
9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:			
<p>On the morning of 12 July 2018, I was serving as the (b)(3), (b)(6) a four man team participating in a Force Protection Patrol (FPP) to clear a village in the Zurmat District of Paktiya Province. The Ground Assault Force (GAF) arrived at our Vehicle Drop Off (VDO) position and began clearing compounds that we planned to use for our (b)(1)1.4a section and Command and Control (C2) element. Once these compounds were cleared, at approximately 0500 local, our team drove up to up to link up with our partner force (b)(1)1.4a. Our team, as well as the (b)(1)1.4a came under accurate enemy fire as the sun rose, obscuring our ability to identify the enemy. We utilized a small piece of cover provided by a dilapidated structure. From our position we we're taking fire from our 9 o'clock position to our two o'clock position. For reference, our 12 o'clock was a heading of 55 degrees. We assessed the fire to be accurate PKM and Sniper fire due to our ability to hear the rounds as they traveled over and beside our position. Our Team Leader (TL), SFC Celiz, was able to identify one of the areas we we're taking fire from in the vicinity of (IVO) the D990 building. One of the advisors and myself engaged known, likely and suspected positions where SFC Celiz had spotted enemy contact. We received radio traffic that our partner force had received one friendly wounded. It was at this time that SFC Celiz decided to utilize the (b)(1)1.4a to engage the D1040 building where we assessed multiple enemy fighters were accurately engaging our position, as well as other friendly positions. At this time we could see rounds impacting around an occupied friendly vehicle adjacent to the D1070 building. SFC Celiz instructed the (b)(1)1.4a and Radio Telephone Operator (RTO) to provide suppressive fire while he and I bounded approximately 20 meters to our truck where we received the (b)(1)1.4a. SFC Celiz was the (b)(1)1.4a and I assumed the (b)(1)1.4a role. With disregard for his own life, SFC Celiz exposed himself to direct fire from the enemy engaging with two rounds of (b)(1)1.4a hitting and reducing a structure approximately 600 meters away. Due to this action, the partner force was able to maneuver to more effectively engage enemy fighting positions.</p> <p>SFC Celiz provided suppressive fire while I bounded back to the dilapidated structure. Once I returned to cover we provided suppressive fire as SFC Celiz returned to our position. SFC Celiz informed us that he wanted to split up to in order to provide medical treatment and evacuation for the wounded partner force soldier. SFC Celiz instructed the (b)(1)1.4a and RTO to remain at the (b)(1)1.4a C2 node to provide areal and direct fire support to suppress and destroy the enemy. SFC Celiz and I bounded back to the truck to grab my blood products. From the truck we moved along the northern wall of building D1080. Once we could see the friendly forces located at the western side of building D1070 we moved to their position. Upon arriving at this location, we we're able to see that the casualty was actually located on the western end of D1080. SFC Celiz provided suppressive fire as I moved to Building D1080. Once I was set I provided overwatch as he moved to me. We worked our way over to the casualty who was supine on a litter. I began treating the casualty who already had basic treatments by the partner force medic. SFC Celiz began assessing the area for a suitable HLZ. When he returned to me he asked me how serious the casualty was. The patient had a gunshot wound (GSW) to the upper right chest. I was unable to palpate a radial pulse or get a reading on my (b)(1)1.4a monitor. When I removed the chest seal that the partner force medic had applied I could hear hissing, indicating that he had a sucking chest wound. I performed a</p>			
10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT		PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)		
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"			
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.			

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT (b)(1)1.4a AF DATED 20180712

9 STATEMENT (Continued)

needle chest decompression. Residual blood seeped out of the wound and I was able to palpate a strong radial pulse. Both of these results confirmed my suspicion of a tension pneumothorax or tension hemo-pneumothorax. I told SFC Celiz and (b)(1)1.4a that he was (b)(1)1.4a but that he was stable for now and I could keep him alive on the ground for a longer if needed. At this time, the enemy contact that we had taken earlier had been suppressed for roughly 30 minutes. The RTO and (b)(1)1.4a had linked back up with us at the casualty location. SFC Celiz worked with the RTO and (b)(1)1.4a send up a 9-line medevac request. As DUSTOFF was inbound to the H LZ, the enemy opened with heavy and sustaining small arms, machine gun and sniper fire from the north. The enemy fire was zeroed in on where DUSTOFF was wheels down. (b)(1)1.4a had already instructed the indigenous litter team to begin moving to the aircraft to load the casualty. I ran out to the DUSTOFF helicopter to give an update on the casualty, but my main intent was to intimate to the crew that they we're taking accurate fire and needed to leave as quickly as possible. I yelled "pneumothorax" at the flight medic and sprinted back, hoping that they recognized my urgency to get out of the dangerous area and would follow suit. As I was running back I saw SFC Celiz with the litter team. I moved passed the (b)(1)1.4a AND RTO to cover. As I moved passed (b)(1)1.4a and RTO they peeled back to cover as well. I turned back to look at the helicopter and saw SFC Celiz providing a high volume of suppressive fire. With no regard for his personal safety and the valiant effort to keep the aircraft, crew, and litter team safe, SFC Celiz continued to engage the enemy until the litter team had finally finished loading the casualty up and began to move back to cover. Once the litter team had moved passed SFC Celiz to get to cover, the DUSTOFF helicopter began to power up. It was only at this time that SFC Celiz stopped firing and began to move to cover. Enemy fire was impacting right at his feet. As he turned to run back to cover, he was immediately hit. He bent over at the waist and waved the bird off as it was barely going wheels up. He attempted to move to cover, but crumpled face down. I yelled at him to crawl to me. He made one attempt to pull himself across the ground, and then lay motionless and unresponsive.

By this time the aircraft was airborne. Our (b)(1)1.4a told DUSTOFF over the radio not to leave and land closer to the compound. Two of our partner force soldiers had already begun running out into the hail of bullets to attempt to pull SFC Celiz to safety. We had been trying to call him to safety for about ten seconds, but he was obviously unable to move. The partner force individuals were unable to move SFC Celiz. As I looked left I saw two of the (b)(1)1.4a sprinting towards SFC Celiz. I ran out to meet them and grabbed SFC Celiz by the left shoulder strap of his body armor and (b)(1)1.4a grabbed the right. Our (b)(1)1.4a immediately showed up and the four of us dragged SFC Celiz to cover as quickly as possible. Our RTO was just to the right of the gun truck providing suppressive fire as we moved to cover. After dragging him approximately 40 meters, I looked right and saw that we had adequate cover. I told everyone to stop and roll him over. We rolled him into the supine position and quickly glanced for any hemorrhage. SFC Celiz was unresponsive throughout the entire time we dragged him face down to cover and he was very pale. We tore off his body armor and one of the (b)(1)1.4a cut the sling to his weapon. At this time DUSTOFF was landing again in a location that was somewhat more protected than the original helicopter landing zone. The four of us grabbed him by his shoulders and legs and began to move to the helicopter. Three partner force soldiers showed up with a litter. We transferred SFC Celiz onto the litter and our (b)(1)1.4a and the three partner force soldiers ran him onto the helicopter. The time between when SFC Celiz was shot to when he was evacuated on DUSTOFF was approximately three minutes.

NOTHING ELSE FOLLOWS.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT (b)(1)1.4a, AF DATED 20180712

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFIDAVIT

(b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND I HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 17 day of JULY, 2018 at (b)(1)1.4a Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a 75th Ranger Regiment ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a 75th Ranger Regiment ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(1)1.4a OIC (Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

<b>SWORN STATEMENT</b>			
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.			
<b>PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT</b>			
<b>AUTHORITY:</b>	Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).		
<b>PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:</b>	To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.		
<b>ROUTINE USES:</b>	Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.		
<b>DISCLOSURE:</b>	Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.		
<b>1. LOCATION</b>	<b>2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)</b>	<b>3. TIME</b>	<b>4. FILE NUMBER</b>
(b)(1)1.4a AFG	20180817	2100	
(b)(3), (b)(6)	<b>6. SSN</b>	(b)(3), (b)(6)	<b>7. GRADE/STATUS</b>
(b)(3), (b)(6)			
<b>8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS</b>			
(b)(1)1.4a 75th Ranger Regiment			
<b>9.</b> I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:			
<p>On 12 JULY 2018, (b)(1)1.4a and a partnered force infilled into Zurmat District, Paktiya Province Afghanistan. We were conducting a Force Protection Patrol (FPP) in order to remove Taliban influence within the Zurmat District. Upon arriving at our vehicle drop off (VDO) location, partnered forces set in (b)(1)1.4a on our NAI and began clearing. Once our initial NAI was cleared, SFC Celiz, (b)(3), (b)(6) and I linked up with the (b)(1)1.4a. At about 0500 local, the assault force began receiving accurate and sustaining machine gun and sniper fire approximately 10-15 round bursts every 15 seconds from the north. The rounds were over our heads initially and were being walked down. This initial contact hit our driver side window in our truck. Our element took cover behind the corner of a dilapidated structure that was approximately 5 feet tall and 8 feet long. SFC Celiz observed enemy fire coming from a compound to the north approximately 400 meters. Along with (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6) engaged with 6 rounds of 7.62 at the reported location with his (b)(1)1.4a. From my assessment the enemy saw us engaging and was now fixed on our dilapidated structure. Once that happened the enemy fire began coming from the east at a rate of 10-15 rounds every 10 seconds. The enemy fire remained accurate and sustaining with rounds impacting our dilapidated structure as well as the eastern wall of building D1080 and southern wall of D1070 located 30 meters west and northwest from our piece of cover. After this engagement we saw dust rising behind the compound, indicating that any remaining fighters might have driven away from that position. Aerial assets were unable to locate the vehicle. For the next two minutes our team was utilizing the small piece of cover to engage the enemy exposing ourselves as little as we could. SFC Celiz informed us that our partner force had taken a casualty. As the assault force tried to gain fire superiority, SFC Celiz decided that we needed to engage with the (b)(1)1.4a so that we could gain fire superiority, reposition gun trucks and reposition the casualty. SFC Celiz instructed (b)(3), (b)(6) and I to lay down suppression fires as they bounded to the vehicle to shoot the (b)(1)1.4a. As (b)(3), (b)(6) and I began suppressing the enemy, we exposed ourselves from the dilapidated structure in order to draw attention away from SFC Celiz who was retrieving the (b)(1)1.4a from the bed of the truck. At this time I could see rounds impact the ground 10-20 meters in from of me as well as on the southern wall of D1070 which was within 10 meters of SFC shooting the (b)(1)1.4a. As we continued to suppress, SFC Celiz exposed himself to direct and accurate enemy fire two times as the gunner, firing two rounds, hitting and reducing a structure 600m away. By the time they had returned I had exposed myself multiple times on the north eastern side of the dilapidated structure expending approximately 45 rounds of 5.56. SGT Celiz's actions allowed our partner force to reposition security to effectively engage the enemy and allow them to reposition the casualty to a safe location.</p> <p>About two minutes after SFC Celiz returned to the dilapidated structure the enemy fire turned into a watch and shoot rate. The enemy fire remained accurate and rounds were still impacting our dilapidated structure and on the ground within 10 meters every minute or two. Once radio traffic indicated that the friendly casualty had sustained a wound to the upper chest. SFC Celiz decided that evacuation of the casualty soon would be our best bet to save his life, considering we had fire superiority and the enemy contact</p>			
<b>10. EXHIBIT</b>	<b>11. INITIALS OF</b>	<b>ING STATEMENT</b>	<b>PAGE 1 OF</b> 3 <b>PAGES</b>
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"			
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.			

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT (b)(1)1.4a AFG DATED 20180817

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

was minimal. SFC Celiz and (b)(3), (b)(6) made their way to the casualty which was on the west outer wall of D1080 (b)(3), (b)(6) and I provided watch and shoot fires to the north and east limiting our exposure. As (b)(3), (b)(6) began working on the casualty, SFC Celiz began analyzing the battlefield and coordinating with (b)(1)1.4a counterparts to locate the best area for a HLZ. Once complete SFC Celiz moved back to our position to inform us that the casualty was packaged up and stable at this time. Throughout the duration of when SFC Celiz and (b)(3), (b)(6) were gone (b)(3), (b)(6) and I utilized the dilapidated structure as cover and continued to engage the enemy. I expended approximately 30 rounds during this time. SFC Celiz (b)(3), (b)(6) and I moved to the west to meet up with the casualty which was on the western wall of D1080. I immediately sent up the MIST report to be relayed to DUSTOFF. While I coordinated with aerial assets, SFC Celiz began sending up the 9 line medevac via (b)(1)1.4a communication (b)(1)1.4a minutes later. SFC Celiz relayed to me that DUSTOFF was wheels up. At this point I also relayed the HLZ brief to our (b)(1)1.4a I set up the (b)(3), (b)(6) brief so that the aircraft would come in from NW to SE which would provide cover from D1060, D1070 and D1080 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) continued to monitor the status of the casualty until DUSTOFF was inbound. (b)(3), (b)(6) threw (b)(1)1.4a where I had instructed him which was roughly 20M west of D1080. As DUSTOFF over flew the HLZ and came in from a reciprocal direction they slowly inched their way towards (b)(1)1.4a before going wheels down 75 meters south of the (b)(1)1.4a before I could provide instruction to the aircraft, the enemy began to open up with AK-47, PKM and sniper fire at a cyclic rate on the HLZ from an unknown location. Rounds were impacting the ground all around the HLZ. The beaten zone of the enemy fire was centered on the aircraft with rounds impacting in and around the aircraft out to 20 meters in all directions. At this point I was located to the right of the gun truck on the SW corner of building D1080. I immediately began to engage known and suspected targets anywhere from 300-900 meters. The fire remained sustained and effect with rounds impacting within two meters of my feet as well as hitting the aircraft. As I continued to engage 1-2 meters outside of cover with a high rate of fire, I watched (b)(3), (b)(6) move under heavy enemy contact ahead of the litter team to conduct the medical hand over with the DUSTOFF flight medic. I watched as the (b)(1)1.4a instructed the litter team to move towards the aircraft. With disregard for his own life, SFC Celiz trailed the litter team and ran all the way to the door of the aircraft to provide cover fire. I then moved under fire and placed myself roughly 10 meters off the nose of DUSTOFF while rounds were still impacting the ground around me. (b)(3), (b)(6) was about 20 meters from the gun truck. At this point the whole (b)(1)1.4a team was exposed to heavy enemy fire. I was firing at a rate of 1 round every 2 seconds. I stopped engaging and began to move back to cover with (b)(3), (b)(6) I stopped short of moving behind the gun truck because I noticed SFC Celiz was still engaging at the door of the aircraft with a high rate of fire. Although we were all still exposed (b)(3), (b)(6) and I began yelling at SFC Celiz to move back to us. I conducted a magazine change and then began moving laterally, closer to the bird to help suppress the enemy as I kept attempting to call SFC Celiz. As the litter team began to make their way back, SFC Celiz continued to engage the enemy and was now located at the cockpit providing a physical barrier between the enemy and the pilot. Once the aircraft began to power up and take off SFC Celiz was struck by enemy fire. I saw anywhere from 10-20 round impacting around him in a 10 meter radius. SFC Celiz fell to a knee and tried to get back up, as he did he waved off DUSTOFF not to remain grounded. We all continued to yell at SFC Celiz to crawl to cover, but he was unresponsive. I immediately began to move and shoot towards our downed TL, at the same time, (b)(3), (b)(6) as well as (b)(1)1.4a began moving towards SFC Celiz in order to drag him to cover which was approximately 45 meters away. The enemy rate of fire had not let up and was still cyclic. As I watched (b)(3), (b)(6) move to our downed TL (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) I picked up the rate of fire in order to move in front of SFC Celiz. Once I expended my magazine I then moved to assist (b)(3), (b)(6) in dragging SFC Celiz behind cover with the help of (b)(1)1.4a While behind cover, I was coordinating to keep DUSTOFF in the airspace (b)(3), (b)(6) informed me that SFC Celiz had been possibly hit in a major organ and that the only thing we could do to save his life was to get him to higher care. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I removed his body armor and began to execute blood sweeps to identify a wound while telling me to bring DUSTOFF back around. At this point the enemy location was still unknown and they were now at a rapid rate of fire. I could still see rounds impact in and around our vicinity approximately 15-20 meters away. Once DUSTOFF was wheels down (b)(3), (b)(6) and I began to hand carry SFC Celiz to the aircraft until three partner soldiers brought us a litter. (b)(3), (b)(6) returned to cover approximately 10 meters away. The enemy gunfire was at a rapid rate. While the three partnered soldiers and I ran back out into enemy fire to load SFC Celiz onto the DUSTOFF aircraft I could still see 3-5 rounds impacting within 10 meters of me. From point of injury to SFC Celiz flushing on DUSTOFF was under 3 minutes.

SFC Celiz exposed himself multiple times that morning and made himself a physical barrier between the enemy and the aircraft. His actions were those of valor and courage. He made selfless decisions that day in order to save multiple lives. The enemy returned to a watch and shoot for the remainder of the operation.

////////////////////////////////////NOTHING ELSE FOLLOWS////////////////////////////////////

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT (b)(1)1.4a AFG DATED 20180817

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 17th day of AUG, 2018

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6)

1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(1)1.4a 75th Ranger Regiment ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(1)1.4a OIC (Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN  
SPECIAL OPERATIONS JOINT TASK FORCE-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A-CG

10 August 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR Commanding General, Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (SOJTF-A), Afghanistan, APO, AE 09354

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) [redacted] (Surgeon for SFC Celiz)

1. On 13 July 2018, I was appointed by the SOJTF-A Commanding General as an investigating officer pursuant to AR 15-6. During the investigation I was not able to gather the medical surgeon [redacted] sworn statement on a DA form 2823. This was due to [redacted] preparing to rotate out of theatre. His sworn statement was captured via NIPR on a word document. I was able to take his statement and scan it to SIPR in order to support SFC Celiz's official medical documentation. [redacted] is the surgeon that worked on SFC Celiz for 1 hour and 40 minutes

2. [redacted] statement will be added as Exhibit G [redacted] (Surgeon) – MFR Sworn Statement.

3. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at SVOIP [redacted] [redacted]

[redacted]  
Investigation Officer

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



SFC Celiz arrived at our facility at approximately 0610 in the morning of 12 July after sustaining a gunshot wound to the right flank. He arrived approximately 10 minutes after injury

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) | I pronounced the patient at 0802.

(b)(6)

Pages 35 through 84 redacted for the following reasons:

.....

- (b)(1), 4a
- (b)(6)

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